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Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 114, 148 P.3d 727 (Dec. 28, 2006) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – DEATH SENTENCE APPEAL
Summary
Appeal from a death sentence following a second penalty hearing conducted pursuant to a
remand by the Nevada Supreme Court.
Disposition/Outcome
Appellant’s arguments failed to establish reversible error and the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed his death sentence.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant Marlo Thomas and Kenya Hall, were charged with two counts of first-degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and several other crimes. The charges stemmed from an
early morning robbery of a restaurant where Thomas stabbed two employees to death. Thomas,
Hall, and Thomas’s wife were arrested later that day.
After their arrest, Hall was interview by Officer Bailey, a Nevada Highway Patrol
Officer. Hall confessed to his role in the crimes, implicated Thomas, and agreed to plead guilty
to lesser charges in exchange for testifying against Thomas. Hall testified at Thomas’s
preliminary hearing but refused to testify further. Hall’s preliminary hearing testimony was read
into the record at Thomas’s trial, where a jury convicted Thomas on two counts of first-degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and several other crimes. After a penalty hearing, the
jury returned two death verdicts for the murders and life in prison without parole for the
remaining convictions.
On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Thomas’s conviction and
sentence. 2 Subsequently, Thomas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district
court denied. Thomas appealed that denial to the Nevada Supreme Court, which found that
Thomas’s trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to an improper penalty phase jury
instruction on the possibility of sentence commutation. The Court remanded the case for a new
penalty hearing. 3
On remand, the district court bifurcated the penalty hearing into an eligibility phase and
selection phase. During the eligibility phase, the State alleged four aggravators: (1) Thomas had
a prior conviction for a felony involving violence or threat of violence; 4 (2) Thomas had a
second such conviction; (3) the murders were committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; 5 and
(4) Thomas was convicted in the instant proceeding of more than one murder. 6 In support of the
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alleged aggravators the State presented Hall’s preliminary testimony that read into the record by
Officer Bailey. In addition, the State admitted the details of Thomas’s 1990 conviction for
attempted robbery, and Thomas’s 1996 conviction for battery with substantial bodily harm.
After deliberating on death eligibility, the jury found all four aggravators, and based on
testimony from Thomas’s family members, the jury found seven mitigators: (1) Thomas
accepted responsibility for the crimes; (2) cooperated with the investigation but diverted the
truth; (3) demonstrated remorse; (4) counseled others against criminal acts; (5) suffered learning
and emotional disabilities; (6) found religion; (7) and had been denied by his father. The jury
determined that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, and the hearing proceeded to the
selection phase.
During the selection phase, the State called a records supervisor for the Division of
Parole and Probation, who authenticated 25 juvenile court petitions charging Thomas with
several crimes, as well as a juvenile court order listing Thomas’s entire juvenile history and
certifying 17 year old Thomas as in adult in his 1990 robbery case. In addition, ten correctional
officers testified about Thomas’s behavior while in prison and authenticated prison discipline
documents.
The selection phase also included victim-impact testimony from the fathers of the two
restaurant stabbing victims. One of the fathers, Mr. Dixon, referred to Thomas as “the lowest for
of social sewage” and was immediately interrupted by an objection from Thomas’s counsel. The
district court advised Mr. Dixon to limit his testimony to the impact of his son’s death on his
family, but the court did not formally sustain the objection. Thomas called five fellow inmates,
the warden of his present institution, and his mother to testify on his behalf. Finally, Thomas
gave a statement in allocution, in which he expressed remorse. After deliberating, the jury
returned two verdicts of death, which Thomas appealed in the present case.
Discussion
The Court reviewed Thomas’s appeal of his death sentence en banc, Justice Hardesty
delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. Application of Crawford v. Washington and the Confrontation Clause
Thomas argued that the district court violated his right to confrontation 7 , as interpreted in
Crawford v. Washington 8 , during the eligibility phase by allowing Officer Bailey to testify about
Hall’s statements during questioning and by admitting the transcript of the questioning. Thomas
also argued that the district court violated the same right, during the selection phase, by
admitting evidence of his juvenile criminal history and behavior while in prison. The Court
rejected these arguments, citing Summers v. State 9 , in which it held that Crawford and the
Confrontation Clause do not apply during a capital penalty hearing.
2. Admission of “Other Matter” Evidence at the Eligibility Phase
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Thomas argued that the district court erred by allowing the State the present “other
matter” evidence during the eligibility phase. There are three proper purposes for which the
State may introduce evidence at a capital penalty hearing: “to prove an enumerated aggravator,
to rebut specific mitigating evidence, or to aid the jury in determining the appropriate sentence
after any enumerated aggravating circumstance have been weighed against any mitigating
circumstance.” 10 The Court referred to the evidence submitted for the third purpose as “other
matter,” which is “not admissible for use by the jury in determining the existence of aggravating
circumstance or weighing them against mitigating circumstances.” 11 Evidence presented to
rebut specific mitigating evidence is not “other matter” and it is permissible during the eligibility
phase if the rebuttal is targeted toward specific mitigation evidence, if not the evidence is other
matter which the State can only present during the selection phase.12 In mitigation, Thomas
called his mother to testify that Thomas’s childhood was good until she had a baby and started
ignoring him and beat him. On cross-examination, the State produced the juvenile court order
pertaining to Thomas’s 1990 robbery charge, which contained statements purportedly by Ms.
Thomas. The State asked Ms. Thomas if, in 1990, she said Thomas was spoil and that her
control of him had been fair, which she could not recall. The Court found that these questions
were proper rebuttal given Ms. Thomas’s specific testimony that she had ignored and beaten
Thomas.
The State also asked Ms. Thomas if she had said that Thomas was “becoming more
dangerous” or “would get into drugs or do things for quick money.” The Court found that the
use of these statements was improper because they were not true rebuttal; Ms. Thomas never
testified on direct examination that Thomas was not dangerous or violent, did not use drugs, or
committed crimes. In fact she testified that she knew he got in fights, committed crimes, and
used drugs. The Court reasoned that because these prior statements were not used to prove an
aggravator or rebut specific mitigating evidence, they were “other matter” evidence not proper at
the eligibility phase. However, the Court concluded that the error was minimal and did not affect
his substantial rights. 13
3. Causation Between Mitigating Evidence and the Crime
Thomas also argued that the district court erred by allowing the State to argue, in its
eligibility phase closing, that there has to be “some causation, connection” between the
mitigating circumstances that occur in a person’s life and the crime before the occurrences
become a mitigating circumstance. The Court agreed that the State’s argument was improper,
but concluded that the impropriety was not prejudicial because the jury instructions expressly
permitted the jury to consider the mitigating circumstance as factors in determining moral
culpability and correctly required no causation between the factors presented and the crime.
4. Cumulative Bad Acts Testimony and an Improper Victim Impact Statement
Thomas argued that cumulative bad acts testimony and an improper victim impact
statement rendered his penalty hearing fundamentally unfair. Relevant evidence “may be
10
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excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by…needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” 14 Applying an abuse of discretion standard, 15 the Court concluded that
the evidence presented by the ten correctional officers was not excessively cumulative because
very little testimony repeated previous evidence, the jury was entitled to learn of Thomas’s
disciplinary record and criminal history, and each incident presented revealed Thomas’s capacity
for threatening and potentially dangerous behavior.
Thomas also challenged Mr. Dixon’s statement, in his victim-impact testimony, that
Thomas was “the lowest from of social sewage.” The Court agreed that this statement was
improper, but ruled that the statement did not require reversal. The Court based this ruling on
the fact that the district court properly admonished Mr. Dixon, the jury presumably expected Mr.
Dixon to abhor Thomas, and Mr. Dixon never expressed his views about sentencing.
5. Mitigating Evidence and Instructions at the Selection Phase
a. Lack of Premeditation
Thomas argued that the district court erred during the selection phase by limiting his
presentation of mitigating evidence and refusing a mitigation instruction. The district court
refused Thomas’s request that the jury be instructed that “the homicide occurred during a
confrontation and as such there was no premeditated intent to cause the death.” NRS 175.554(1)
requires the district court to instruct on “alleged mitigators upon which evidence has been
presented and does not restrict such instruction to the enumerated statutory mitigators.” 16
Evidence that Thomas lacked premeditation was admitted into the record through his
interrogation, in which he made a claim that the killings were done in self-defense. Thus, the
Court found that Thomas was entitled to an instruction that he was alleging lack of premeditation
as a mitigating circumstance. However, the Court also found that Thomas’s proposed instruction
was worded as a theory of law and was therefore improper. 17 In addition, Thomas failed to
establish authority for the proposition that premeditation cannot, as a matter of law, be formed
during a confrontation. Finally, the jury was instructed that it could find “any other mitigating
circumstances” and Thomas had argued to the jury that the killings were not premeditated.
b. The Role of an Uncharged Participant
Thomas argued that he should have been permitted to argue that his wife’s involvement
in the crimes and the State’s failure to charge her, for her involvement, were mitigating
circumstances. In rejecting this argument, the Court pointed to NRS 175.552(3) which provides
that mitigating circumstances must relate to “the offense, defendant, or victim and on any other
matter which the court deems relevant to sentence.” The Court found that Thomas failed to
show how the State’s decision not to prosecute his wife was relevant to his sentence.
6. The Constitutionality of Nevada’s Death Penalty Scheme
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Finally, Thomas argued that the Nevada death penalty scheme is unconstitutional, in part,
because it prevents a defendant from participating in the decision to seek death the death penalty.
The Court, relying on its own precedent, stated that matters of prosecution in any criminal case
are within the entire control of the district attorney absent any unconstitutional discrimination. 18
7. Mandatory Death Sentence Review
Pursuant to NRS 177.055(2)(c)-(e), the Court reviewed Thomas’s death sentence. The
Court determined that the evidence supported the findings of aggravating circumstances, the
sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor, and
the sentence was not excessive, considering the crime and the defendant.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions
Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, delivered a concurring
opinion stating his belief that in a bifurcated capital penalty hearing the right to confront the
declarant of testimonial hearsay only extends to evidence admitted during the eligibility phase.
Here Officer Bailey’s testimonial hearsay about Hall’s statements was admitted during the
eligibility phase, but because Hall was not available to testify and because Thomas had an
opportunity to cross-examine him during the preliminary hearing it was not error to admit that
evidence.
Conclusion
While it was found that Thomas’s penalty hearing was not free of error, the Court
concluded that the sentence was fair and none of Thomas’s arguments established reversible
error.
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